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1. accurately represent the philosophical point in the presentation2. advance the logical investigation of some aspect of the philosophical point in a “pro” or “con” evaluative stance3. connect the abstract philosophical point to some events in the contemporary world in which the student lives?you can add some videos however they shouldn’t be longer than 3 minutes, add a few questions to the audience the presentation should be 10 minutes. be creative add pictures.4.i will upload the rubric and the outline for the arguments, do argument 2 only.
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Aristotle’s De Anima
Outlines
1. The method for determining the essence and definition of the soul is extremely
difficult—I.1 (402a 1-18)
2. [Though thinking can exist without the body, all other of the soul’s properties
cannot]—I.1 (403a 9-12)
3. The soul is the first actuality of a natural body—II.1 (412a 10-28)
4. [Imagination is not: (a) reasoning, (b) sense perception simpliciter, (c) belief, (d)
some form of opinion, but is a power under our control that begins with sensation
(especially sight) and actively (under the power of the agent) arranges images in
such a way that they paint a personal vision of the world that is often factually
(empirically) inaccurate]—III.3 (427a 16-429a 2)
5. The rational soul remains pure, immaterial, and separable from the body—III.4
(429a 19-429b 6
6.
The mind when it comprehends concrete objects abstractly it understands
potentially and when it understands actually, the form is combined with matter;
however with speculative knowledge thought and object are identical—III.4
(429b 1-430a 9)
7. The rational soul requires the imagination for its operation, but is not (strictly
speaking) reducible to the imagination—III.8 (431b 21-22-432a 14)
Aristotle’s De Anima
Argument #1
The method for determining the essence and definition of the soul is extremely difficult/
402a 1-18
1. The objects of knowledge vary according to the exact way in which they are
known and according to their exalted natures—A/402a 2-3
2. [The two criteria in premise #1 constitute the normative standards for judging
knowledge]—A
3. The study of the soul is about all truth via the study of nature and the principle of
life—A/402a 6-7
4. The study of the soul seeks an exact account—A/ 402a 12-13
5. The study of the soul is a very important topic—1-4/ 402a 4
6. There is either one single method for determining the essence and definition [of
the soul] or there is one definition for each group—A/ 402a 14
7. Determining the essence and definition is always difficult—A/ 402a 14-18
8. [Normal difficulties are magnified when studying exalter objects]—A
9. The method for determining the essence and definition of the soul is extremely
difficult—5-8/ 402a 12
First sentence:
s’
s’
’s
sKnowledge is held to be noble and valuable (prized), but some
more than others because of its accuracy or because it tells of fine and wonderful
things—but either way the study of the soul is rightly held to be of primary importance.
Aristotle’s De Anima
Argument #2
Though thinking can exist without the body, all other of the soul’s properties cannot,
403a 9-12
1. [Whatever cannot exist in its own right (idion autes) cannot exist independently
and vice versa]—F/403a 9
2. All properties of the soul (with one possible exception, 403a9, d’eoiken idion to
noein) are understood in relation to the body—F/403a 11
3. All properties of the soul (with one possible exception) cannot exist without the
body—1,2—403a 12
4. [Thinking is idion autes]—A
5. Thinking exists without the body—1, 4/403a 10
6. [Though thinking can exist without the body, all other of the soul’s properties
cannot]—3, 5/ 403a 12
Aristotle’s De Anima
Argument #3
The soul is the first actuality of a natural body/ 412a 10-28
1. Matter is potentiality; form is actuality—A/412a 10
2. Some bodies (organized matter—morphe according to nature—phusin) have life
while some do not—A/410a 11-13
3. Life means self-subsistence, growth, and decay—A/412a 14
4. [The principle of life is soul]—A
5. Body cannot be soul—1-4/ 412a 18
6. [‘Ousia’ (substance) is the name given to compounds of potentiality and
actuality]—A
7. The soul is a form of the body—A/ 412a 21
8. The soul is a formal actuality/substance of the body—6,7/ 412a 23
9. The soul is the first actuality of a natural body—4, 5, 8/ 412a 28
Aristotle’s De Anima
Argument #4
[Imagination is not: (a) reasoning, (b) sense perception simpliciter, (c) belief, (d) some
form of opinion, but is a power under our control that begins with sensation (especially
sight) and actively (under the power of the agent) arranges images in such a way that they
paint a personal vision of the world that is often factually (empirically) inaccurate]—427a
16-429a2
1. There are two special characteristics of the soul: (a) local motion, (b) thinking,
discriminating, and perceiving—A/ 427a 16
2. Thinking is both speculative and practical (voein, phronein) and sometimes is
connected with perceiving (aisthanesthai)—F/ 427a 20
3. All living creatures perceive but only a few can think practically—F/ 427b 8-9
4. Practical thinking is not the same as perceiving—1-3/ 427b 6
5. Perceiving is always true (meaning you perceive what you perceive) and is found
in all animals—A/ 427b 12
6. Speculative thinking can be right or wrong and is found in only the animals that
think—A/ 427b 14
7. [Thinking is not the same as perceiving]—4-6
8. Imagination is either from discursive thinking or from perception—A/ 427b 15
9. Imagining is within our power whenever we wish it (we can create mental
pictures according to some order)—A/ 427b 19
10. Reasoning cannot escape the laws of logic (we are bound by right and wrong)—
A/ 427b 21
11. Reasoning is bound by the consequences of our thoughts (e.g., fearful and
threatening emotions occasioned by certain thoughts [though we can imagine
ourselves as unaffected)—A/ 427b 22
12. [Identical powers must have identical properties]—F
13. Reasoning is not the same as imagination—7, 9-12/ 427b 15
14. Imagination must be from sensation (though accompanied by judgment)—8, 13/
427b 15
15. Sense perception is a faculty or an activity (sight and seeing)—F/ 428a 6
16. Imagination can take place without either the exercised faculty or the activity, as
such (like drama in which Oedipus puts his eyes out off stage)—F/ 428a 7
17. Imagination is not the same as sense perception—12, 15, 16/ 428a 7
18. Sensation is always present for all animals while imagination is not—F/ 428a 10
19. [Imagination is not the same as sense perception]—12, 18
20. Sensations are always true while imaginations are generally false—A/ 428a 12
[note here that “false” means that they might not match to the empirical object,
thus my image of my father when I was a boy might not match an actual
photograph (imagination vs. reality—note realism assumption), but while you are
there your sight of the person before you and the photograph—sensation—will
match]
21. [Imagination is not the same as sense perception]—12, 20
22. In ordinary discourse when sensation operates correctly we do not use the term
‘imagination’ but we do when our senses do not judge accurately—F/ 428a 14
23. [Imagination is not the same as sense perception]—12, 22
24. We can imagine with our eyes shut while we cannot see with our eyes shut—F/
428a 15
25. [Imagination is not the same as sense perception]—12, 24/ 17, 19, 21, 23, 25
26. Opinion (doxa) involves belief (pistis)—F/ 428a 20
27. Animals can have imagination but never belief—A/ 428a 22
28. [Imagination is not the same as belief]—12, 27
29. All opinions are accompanied by belief, and all belief is accompanied by
conviction (pepeisthai), and all conviction by the discourse of reason (logos)—A/
428a 25-26
30. The content of an opinion cannot be different from a perception (if sensation and
opinion were the same)—A/ 428a 30
31. We can have an opinion that is different from a perception, such as seeing the sun
to be a foot wide when we opine that it is really larger than the earth—F/ 428b 4
32. Imagination cannot be: (a) opinion plus sensation, (b) opinion mediated by
sensation or (c) a blend of opinion and sensation—12, 29-31
33. Imagination is impossible without sensation—A/ 428b 12 [sensation necessarily
is the cause of the operation of imagination, is incapable of existing unless a prior
sensation was present, its possession contains sensations that are both active and
passive and the result may be true or false]
34. The following is the nature of sense perception: (a) Sense perception is never in
error, (b) the concomitance of can cause error [that there is white before us cannot
be in error, but what this white is, may be in error], (c) perception of the universal
that attaches to the concomitance may be false [such as motion or magnitude—the
first may be free from error if the sense is still present, b & c may be in error even
if sense is still present]—A/ 428b 17-32
35. Our common language often links sensation with imagination [imagination =
phantasia <= phaos (light), this is because it is not possible to see without light]—F/ 429a 1-4 36. [Imagination requires the prior activity of sensation]—33-35 __________________________________ 37. [Imagination is not: (a) reasoning, (b) sense perception simpliciter, (c) belief, (d) some form of opinion, but is a power under our control that begins with sensation (especially sight) and actively (under the power of the agent) arranges images in such a way that they paint a personal vision of the world that is often factually (empirically) inaccurate]—13, 14, 25, 32, 36 [note: #34, see Plato, Tim 52a, Phil 39b] Aristotle’s De Anima Argument #5 The rational soul remains pure, immaterial, and separable from the body/ 429a 19-429b 6 1. Anaxagoras was correct when he declared that the soul must be uncontaminated—F/ 429a 19 2. To be “contaminated” is to add some other duty to the soul beyond its capacity to receive—A/ 429a 22 3. [Whenever one adds a new duty to a finite system there are fewer resources available for the principal tasks]—F 4. [The soul is a finite system]—A 5. To contaminate the soul would hinder or obstruct it in its operation—1-4/ 429a 22 6. If the rational soul were material, then it would possess material properties—F/ 429a 24 7. [Possessing material properties would not aid in the soul’s principal task: receiving information]—A 8. The rational soul is not material—5-7/ 429a 25 9. The rational soul does not have an organ associated with it—A/ 429a 26 10. [To be material—like sight—a form must be linked to an organ]—F 11. The rational soul is not material—9, 10/ 429a 26 ___________________________ 12. The rational soul remains pure, immaterial, and separable from the body—5, 8, 11/ 429b 6 Aristotle’s De Anima Argument #6 The mind when it comprehends concrete objects abstractly it understands potentially and when it understands actually, the form is combined with matter; however with speculative knowledge thought and object are identical—429b 1-430a 9 1. Intense observations or stimulations by the sense organs makes them tired while intense stimulation of the mind does not make it tired—A/429b 1-2 2. [The body becomes tired after stimulation while the mind does not]—A/429b 4 3. The rational soul is not of the body—1, 2/429b 4 4. [The mind interacts with the world]—F 5. [In order to interact with the world the mind must see a form and the form in a matter]—A 6. The mind sees both the form and the form in the matter—4, 5/ 429b 13 7. The form itself is an abstraction (it is like a blank slate that is actualized with letters: the mind is mere potentiality until actualizes itself with a thought)—A/ 430a1 8. The mind can view both abstractions and concrete facts—6, 7/ 430a 3ff 9. [Abstractions of empirical objects are potentially many instantiations (of actual concrete objects)]—A 10. The objects of speculative knowledge have no matter (thought and object are identical)—A/ 430a 4 __________________________ 11. The mind when it comprehends concrete objects abstractly it understands potentially and when it understands actually, the form is combined with matter; however with speculative knowledge thought and object are identical—3, 6, 8, 9/ 430a 1-9 Aristotle’s De Anima Argument #7 The rational soul requires the imagination for its operation, but is not (strictly speaking) reducible to the imagination—431b 21-22-432a 14 1. Existing things are either sensible or thinkable—F/ 431b 21-22 2. [The soul is responsible for sensation and for reason]—F 3. The soul is in one sense in all existing things—1, 2/ 431b 20 4. Both knowledge and sensation are divided to correspond to their objects: potential to potential and actual to actual—A/ 431b 25-28 5. The mode of this correspondence can either be in the things themselves or present in the via the form—F/ 431b 27 6. [The soul is immaterial]—F 7. [The material cannot be in the immaterial]—F 8. The mode of correspondence of objects within the soul must be via the form—57/ 431b 27-30 9. [Whatever is present in the form acts in a meta-controlling fashion]—A 10. The soul acts in a meta-controlling fashion to connect the potential with the actual in the cognition and perception of objects—3, 8, 9/ 432a 1-3 [cf. the hand is a tool for using tools so also is the soul] 11. There is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes—A/ 432a 4 12. [We can only know that which is outside and separate in existence]—A 13. The objects of thought (both sensible and abstract) are in the sensible forms—11, 12/ 432a 6 14. [Sensation is our first connection with that which is outside and separate]—A 15. No one can learn anything in the absence of sensation13, 14/ 432a 7 16. [Sensation produces mental pictures to reason]—A 17. Whenever we think it is necessary that our thoughts are accompanied by mental pictures—13, 15, 16/ 432a 8-9 [for mental pictures are like sensory objects without the matter] 18. What is true and false involves a synthesis of concepts—A 19. [Pictures are, by nature, simple presentations]—A 20. [What is simple cannot be a synthesis]—A 21. The imagination presents mental pictures—A/ 432a 10 22. The imagination, strictly speaking, is not true or false—18-21/ 432a10 ___________________________ 23. The rational soul requires the imagination for its operation, but is not (strictly speaking) reducible to the imagination—10, 17, 22/ 432a 11-14 Note: I have fashioned premise #16 in a rather Kantian fashion, cf. schematism in the ‘A’ edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. Student Committee Report Grading Rubric Each student will receive an individual grade for each committee report based upon the categories below. Grades will be accumulated and averaged for the course committee grade. Assessment marks: √ = expected level; √+ = above expected level; √- =below expected level Category One: Did the student accurately represent the philosophical point in his or her presentation? Category Two: Did the student advance the logical investigation of some aspect of the philosophical point in a “pro” or “con” evaluative stance? Category Three: Did the student connect the abstract philosophical point to some events in the contemporary world in which the student lives? Grade: Comments: ... 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